Journalists work in the media centre as the opening ceremony of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit is displayed on a screen in Tianjin on September 1, 2025. (Photo by Pedro PARDO / AFP)
Should Myanmar get full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)? Currently, the country is an SCO dialogue partner – a status it gained in 2023. Chinese President Xi Jinping had vowed to support1 Myanmar’s SCO entry bid during his meeting with SSPC chief Min Aung Hlaing at the sidelines of the 25th Heads of State Council meeting in Tianjin. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also reaffirmed India’s commitment to push for Myanmar’s formal entry into the grouping2 – founded in 2001 to catalyse collaborative efforts on regional, geopolitical, and geostrategic challenges. The Shanghai Spirit – encompassing mutual trust and benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity, and pursuit of common development – forms the core of SCO’s functioning. It is consistent with Panchsheel – the five principles of peaceful co-existence3. In Russian President Vladimir Putin’s words4, SCO is strongly committed to creating a truly just and multipolar world order, which is based on international law and the common principles of mutually respectful cooperation between sovereign States, with the United Nations having a central, coordinating role in it.
Myanmar’s current political situation, however, puts existing SCO members in a real dilemma. The country’s legitimacy is hotly contested globally, given the ongoing instability and human rights concerns arising out of the 2021 military coup 5. Therefore, full membership could be a hugely controversial issue and undermine the SCO’s stated goal of ushering in regional stability through active engagement. An argument has gained ground that widespread human rights abuses and suppression of democratic freedom, which are incompatible with the SCO’s founding principles, make Myanmar unsuitable for membership. Until and unless a popularly elected government takes charge in Naypyitaw, Myanmar’s internal disturbances may have a spillover effect on regional stability – a core objective of the SCO. Already, there has been restricted regionalization of Myanmar’s internal conflict, with its effect proliferating across the frontier into India, Thailand, and Bangladesh – in the form of refugee outflux, arms smuggling, and guerrilla linkages. Besides, granting full membership without a rider could seriously jeopardize all the international efforts to restore democracy in Myanmar, as the SCO will be seen as condoning the actions of the military junta and disregarding its human rights record.
As a dialogue partner, Myanmar has no voting rights in the SCO and is only invited to specific events involving economic forums, media interaction, and people-to-people dialogues. But what will be the impact of Myanmar’s rubbing of shoulders with Eurasian great powers, including China, Russia, and India – the countries that provide strategic heft as well as military and economic influence to the SCO? In diplomacy, symbolism does matter. Myanmar’s very presence in the SCO sends a signal to both domestic and international audiences that it is not an isolated nation languishing on the sidelines. It sits alongside major powers, has access to multilateral networks beyond the West, which reinforces its standing quietly. This is no less vital than material support, especially for a country torn apart by fratricidal violence and turmoil. Hence, despite suffering from deepening humanitarian crises – with the economy imploding, civil war intensifying, and millions forced into displacement – Myanmar is still nourished by a robust regional setting where practical alignments are being shaped silently.
For the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) leading the resistance in Myanmar, this creates a challenge. If they are unable to amplify their longing for democracy and human rights, the junta will leverage the SCO’s declaration on terrorism to brand the People’s Defence Force and the larger resistance movement as terror actors posing a threat to the neighbourhood.
Today, Myanmar’s largest investor, trader, and infrastructure developer is China. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor6 is designed to create a physical and economic link between China’s Yunnan Province and Myanmar’s Bay of Bengal coast – passing through cities like Mandalay and Yangon and the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone. The corridor involves significant infrastructure projects, including railways, roads, ports, and industrial zones. India, meanwhile, has adjusted its policy because of the fragmentation of Myanmar’s State. New Delhi is balancing engagement with Naypyidaw while simultaneously reaching out to the regime’s opponents, controlling much of the peripheral region bordering India. Infrastructure connectivity remains the plinth of India’s Act East Policy 7 that regulates relations with Myanmar. But worsening security and domestic instability have disrupted the Flagship Kaladan Multimodal Project and India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project – connecting Manipur with Mae Sot in Thailand via Mandalay and Bagan in Myanmar. Russia, too, has deepened its military ties with Myanmar, selling arms and making diplomatic overtures. For the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) leading the resistance in Myanmar, this creates a challenge. If they are unable to amplify their longing for democracy and human rights, the junta will leverage the SCO’s declaration on terrorism to brand the People’s Defence Force and the larger resistance movement as terror actors posing a threat to the neighbourhood. The struggle for democracy notwithstanding, SCO’s upgraded engagement with Myanmar will be encouraged, consequently, as it could provide an international platform for dialogue and reconciliation and enable other member states to exert influence on the junta to adopt humane policies and be more responsible.
Seema Sengupta is a Kolkata-based journalist and columnist.
References
- https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-30/china-s-xi-offers-backing-for-myanmar-s-sco-membership-bid ↩︎
- https://www.gnlm.com.mm/india-supports-myanmars-sco-entry/ ↩︎
- https://www.mea.gov.in/uploads/publicationdocs/191_panchsheel.pdf ↩︎
- https://www.sb.by/en/putin-sco-is-firmly-committed-to-building-truly-just-and-multipolar-world-order.html ↩︎
- https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar ↩︎
- https://egrowfoundation.org/research/cmec-and-its-strategic-implications/ ↩︎
- https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1705487 ↩︎