India Ambassador Abhay Thakur at Sittwe Port of Kaladan Project
Photo – India in Myanmar (Embassy of India, Yangon)
For India, Myanmar is of high strategic value, given its geographical proximity to Southeast Asia and being a significant source of rare earth minerals, particularly heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium. New Delhi’s principal connectivity projects in Myanmar include the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Corridor (KMTTP) 1 and India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMT Highway)2. The KMTTP links India’s eastern ports to its northeastern provinces via the Kaladan River and a road component from Paletwa to Aizawl. The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, on the other hand, aims to promote trade and transit between India and Southeast Asia. It connects Moreh in India’s Manipur province with Mae Sot in Thailand via Mandalay and Naypyitaw in Myanmar, and has a provision for extension to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the future. Even though the Sittwe Port in Rakhine – an integral part of KMTTP – has been operationalised3, and is now under Indian control, a substantial portion of the project remains incomplete.
On the critical mineral front, India is desperately seeking to secure rare earth minerals from Myanmar4, especially from mining areas controlled by the Kachin Independence Army, to reduce its dependence on China, currently dominating global supply. Due to the ongoing civil conflict, Indian investments in Myanmar are facing a heightened risk of disruption. Though the resistance has not seized any India-financed project as of now, new ground realities call for improvisation in strategy so that the post-Operation 1027 territorial fragmentation and administrative instability can be circumvented5. Deploying India’s industrial security force, mandated to guard commercial installations and projects, is out of question because Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution explicitly prohibits the stationing of foreign troops on its soil6. Therefore, the information of the Government of India quietly contemplating the appointment of private security contractors to protect Indian investment interests in Myanmar comes as no surprise, since the tactically drained Tatmadaw cannot guarantee absolute security to project sites and personnel working therein.
In a conflict-ridden world, private security companies are increasingly playing a crucial role in conflict situations by providing a wide range of services – from logistics and training to combat support and private security for corporations. They are efficiently plugging the gaping security holes in areas with a limited military footprint. While such contractors are considered invaluable tools for supporting military operations or protecting assets, there are persistent concerns about their accountability, transparency, and adherence to international humanitarian law7. In Myanmar, for instance, Human Rights groups have flagged issues like a lack of clear regulation, difficulty in assigning accountability, and the risk of abuses like excessive use of force and even human trafficking. And given the vagueness in law, these are not exaggerated concerns.
The information of the Government of India quietly contemplating the appointment of private security contractors to protect Indian investment interests in Myanmar comes as no surprise, since the tactically drained Tatmadaw cannot guarantee absolute security to project sites and personnel working therein.
Myanmar’s 2025 Private Security Services Law does provide a formal structure to a parallel security setup, but it is not adequate to hold parent companies accountable for the actions of private security firms because they are often hired as subcontractors by local subsidiaries. Besides, there is little detail available in the public domain about the companies granted a license to operate as private security contractors. Therefore, any effort on the part of the civil liberty groups in tracking their record is effectively forestalled despite allegations of torture, killings, sexual assault, and human trafficking. Adding to the woe, Chinese private security firms have been implicated in human rights violations, and their mandatory collaboration with Tatmadaw will likely exacerbate abuses and generate a groundswell of disenchantment as well8.
New Delhi must tread carefully in choosing its mercenary security corps for safeguarding the investment projects in areas where Myanmar’s State authority is either non-existent due to resistance sweeps or under severe challenge. Officially, India does not have private military contractors9 as it is illegal to raise mercenary forces in the country. Under the Indian Penal Code, such acts are interpreted as waging war against the State. However, India is neither a party to the UN Convention on mercenaries nor a signatory to the Montreux document. Only time will tell whether that loophole is exploited to give birth to officially recognized security contractors.
Till then, India’s options in Myanmar are limited to aligning with either Chinese-managed or West-linked private security firms10. While U.S. government security contractors are not known to be operating in Myanmar overtly, privately owned firms with former U.S. military experts on board do handle risk assessment work for international investors and provide solutions11. The Chinese, on the other hand, have teamed up with Myanmar’s Junta to establish a Myanmar-China joint security company12. Whichever side India takes, the risk of provoking domestic backlash is a real one because the local ethnicities perceive the foreign-backed private security groups as a force multiplier of the ruling regime, eating into their cherished autonomy.
Seema Sengupta is a Kolkata-based journalist and columnist.
References
- https://www.ijfmr.com/papers/2024/4/26857.pdf ↩︎
- https://infra.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/roads-highways/india-myanmar-thailand-highway-indian-envoy-reviews-progress-on-key-project-in-myanmar/123039245 ↩︎
- https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1922176®=3&lang=2 ↩︎
- https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/india-myanmar-rare-earth-kia-rebel-supply-deal-china-mining-control-125091000378_1.html ↩︎
- https://www.brookings.edu/articles/operation-1027-changing-the-tides-of-the-myanmar-civil-war/ ↩︎
- https://cnimyanmar.com/index.php/english-edition/9120-no-foreign-troops-shall-be-deployed-in-myanmar-snr-gen ↩︎
- https://press.un.org/en/2018/gashc4246.doc.htm#:~:text=The%20Third%20Committee%20
(Social%2C%20Humanitarian%20and%20Cultural),Abductions%20*%20Arbitrary%20detention%20*%
20Sexual%20violence ↩︎ - https://humanrightsmyanmar.org/chinese-security-companies-exacerbate-human-rights-violations-in-myanmar/ ↩︎
- https://www.theweek.in/news/defence/2024/09/04/will-india-ever-have-private-army-like-wagner-group-heres-what-former-iaf-chief-rks-bhadauria-thinks.html#:~:text=In%20an%20interview%20to%20Bharat,of%
20control%20over%20military%20operations.%22 ↩︎ - https://www.intelligenceonline.com/europe-russia/2024/05/07/retired-us-marine-opens-doors-for-security-firms-in-myanmar,110223644-art ↩︎
- https://www.france24.com/en/20190321-former-blackwater-contractor-myanmar-security-venture ↩︎
- https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-joint-security-proposal-sparks-controversy-in-myanmar/7870325.html ↩︎