Photo – MNA
The World Bank has announced that Myanmar’s economy is expected to contract by 2.5% in 2025. However, this seems inaccurate, and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing demonstrated this by attending costly forums and international events in July 2025 to refute the World Bank’s report, which stated that Myanmar still has sufficient funds to spend. This time, he visited Moscow for the third time in nearly a year to participate in the “World Atomic Forum” at the invitation of President Putin. As a country currently embroiled in civil war with a weak economy and having to spend a significant amount of money to rebuild infrastructure heavily damaged during the strong earthquake last March, and of course, for the upcoming series of General Elections in December and January, the costs of joining the forum are quite substantial and raise questions such as “is it really necessary to attend the forum?” and “is the military leader ensuring his position with Russia’s leader by making deals on many new state-backed projects?” since he did not bring famous ones for the new government and military in 2026.
According to the Forum’s official website, participants must pay a delegation fee of €2,500, with a special discount of €300 available for registration when more than two persons attend from the same organisation or institution. Sources also stated that the Myanmar delegation must pay these fees to participate in the forum and cover their own living expenses. As reported in the press, the Myanmar delegation stayed at the five-star “Radisson Collection Hotel”, which is part of the Soviet-era Seven Sisters buildings and located by the Moscow River, opposite the office of the Russian Prime Minister, the Russian White House. According to the hotel’s official rate, the Presidential suite costs USD 26,351.89 per night, while the Collection and Grand Residential suites cost USD 7,823.22 and USD 5599.78 per night. All suites were fully booked for three nights, from September 24 to 27, coinciding with the stay of the Myanmar delegation at the hotel. Furthermore, the military leader also attended the annual inner-circle workshop, which was exclusively for military students pursuing Doctor of Science (D.Sc.) degrees (equivalent to postdoctoral studies in the West), PhD, and Postgraduate degrees in Russian universities, by granting it a state-sponsored event titled “Youth and Future Myanmar-Science and Technology” at the same hotel.
During his recent visit to Beijing earlier this month, he brought a list of famous individuals slated for future leadership positions in government and the military to Chinese officials. Some rumours suggested that Xi Jinping advised Min Aung Hlaing to resign from all positions after the elections and transfer power to the younger generation during the meeting. Reflecting on this, he did not bring any famous individuals for the future government and military leadership with him on his recent trip to Moscow. Therefore, the timing of this trip to Moscow, two months before the elections, highlights Min Aung Hlaing’s reliance on Russia as both a diplomatic counterbalance to China and a source of external legitimacy, while also contributing to his potential stability in the upcoming state administration after the general election.
These manoeuvres reveal an elite-led, state-centric approach to crisis management – one focused on political survival, international legitimacy, and elite interests, rather than broad-based economic recovery or meaningful social development.
Furthermore, military leaders have initiated remarkable engagements with Moscow to foster scientific progress and modernisation, rather than with Beijing, since they seized the country’s power. With Russia, Min Aung Hlaing has requested Putin’s support for nuclear power and space cooperation in Myanmar, while the Myanmar Ambassador has asked for Chinese help on nuclear power once. During the recent trip, Space cooperation was a significant topic of discussion. He visited Russia’s State Space Corporation, “ROSCOSMOS,” and discussed satellite development, remote sensing, and, most importantly, data sharing with Russian officials. Similar to China, he also visited the China National Space Administration and met with its director general, focusing on comparable training and cooperation initiatives in early this month.
Earlier this year, the regime also established a “National Space Agency” as part of its broader science and technology strategy. The CEO, Vice-CEO, and directors are from Min Aung Hlaing’s inner circle, making the agency independent and subject to his full oversight as part of his strategic use of sectors to strengthen power. Although he is actively involved in nuclear and space development, and despite those agreements and announcements, actual progress has been limited due to financial constraints, and technology transfer requirements continue to present significant barriers. Nevertheless, the creation of the agency and the regime’s engagements highlight an effort to appear technologically advanced on the international stage.
Min Aung Hlaing visited Kazakhstan after Russia, becoming the first leader from Myanmar to do so since the two countries established diplomatic relations. Notably, as he has always been a steadfast supporter and defender of Buddhism, this is the second time he has engaged with regionally significant leaders from Islamic states in Central Asia, thereby strengthening his image as a friend of all faiths. Furthermore, the Kazakh president discussed his country’s key role in “China’s Belt and Road Initiative” and the Central Asia region during his meeting with Min Aung Hlaing, according to Kazinform, while a press release from the military-controlled news agencies completely ignored the discussion of the two countries’ potential collaboration under the “China’s Belt and Road Initiative”.
In conclusion, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s recent engagements reflect his broader strategy of leveraging foreign alliances to secure diplomatic legitimacy and strengthen regime stability amid economic downturn and ongoing internal conflicts. The high-profile nature and substantial costs of these diplomatic initiatives, despite Myanmar’s financial constraints and urgent domestic needs, emphasise the regime’s focus on external image-building and consolidating Min Aung Hlaing’s personal power network over immediate economic or reconstruction priorities. These strategic shifts highlight a deliberate effort to diversify Myanmar’s international partners and reduce overreliance on China, especially as Beijing’s support appears increasingly conditional and complex.
Ultimately, these manoeuvres reveal an elite-led, state-centric approach to crisis management – one focused on political survival, international legitimacy, and elite interests, rather than broad-based economic recovery or meaningful social development. This raises important questions about the SSPC’s capacity for sustainable governance and its willingness to allocate resources towards inclusive national development rather than merely safeguarding the regime’s leaders.
Kaung Htet Naing is an analyst focusing on the dynamics of Myanmar–Russia relations.
The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of ISP-Myanmar.